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ABSTRACT 
Stratification, Social Networks in the Labour Market, and Intergenerational 
Mobility 
by Dan Anderberg and Fredrik Andersson 
This paper uses a model of human capital accumulation, labour market 
distortions, word-of-mouth communication, and community formation to analyse 
socio-economic stratification, educational choices and intergenerational social 
mobility. Workers obtain information about job opportunities from individuals in 
their local environment, implying that the social environment partly determines 
the expected returns to education. Stratified equilibria, when they exist, are 
characterised by low intergenerational social mobility and inefficient use of 
talent. The equilibrium responses to factors that generally encourage education 
may, in stratified outcomes, be highly asymmetric across socio-economic 
groups. 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Stratifikation, soziale Netzwerke im Arbeitsmarkt und intergenerationale 
Mobilität 
Der Beitrag verwendet ein Model mit Humankapitalakkumulation, Verzerrungen 
auf dem Arbeitsmarkt, Mund-zu-Mund-Kommunikation und Nachbarschafts-
bildung, um sozioökonomische Stratifikation, Bildungsentscheidungen und 
intergenerationale soziale Mobilität zu analysieren. Arbeitnehmer erhalten 
Informationen über freie Arbeitsplätze von Individuen in ihrer Umgebung. Dies 
impliziert, dass der erwartete Ertrag der Bildungsentscheidungen von der 
sozialen Umgebung abhängig ist. Stratifizierte Gleichgewichte, falls sie 
existieren,  zeichnen sich durch geringe intergenerationale Mobilität und eine 
ineffizient niedrige Ausschöpfung von Begabungen aus. Die Gleichgewichts-
reaktionen auf erhöhte Bildungsanreize können in stratifizierten Gleichgewich-
ten sehr asymmetrisch für verschiedene sozioökonomische Gruppen ausfallen. 
 
I Introduction
Recent decades have seen a pronounced increase in inequality in many countries, along with
increasing wage returns to education. The increase in the returns to skill in many markets has
encouraged participation in education. The response, however, has not been uniform across
income groups. In the UK for example, the participation rate in higher education has more
than doubled over the last twenty years; this general expansion has been accompanied by
a strengthening of the education-parental income relationship, with participation in higher
education rising much faster in the higher income groups than in the lower income groups
(Blanden, Gregg and Machin, 2002). A similar development is manifest in the US; while there
was a substantial increase in college attendance in the 1980s, the increase was much smaller
among children from poor families than among children from rich families (Ellwood and Kane,
1999, and Acemoglu and Pischke, 2001). The uneven responses imply that further increases
in inequality may be looming, and gaining an understanding of the causes of the asymmetric
responses is of great importance if appropriate counteracting policies are to be designed.
The economic explanation traditionally put forward for the generally observed positive rela-
tionship between participation in education and parental income is the idea that poor families
may be credit constrained (Loury, 1981 and Becker and Tomes, 1986). If children from poor
families are unable to finance education, they will be in a weak position to respond to any in-
creases in the returns to such investments. The evidence on the importance of credit constraints
has been inconclusive so far, however; several diﬀerent approaches and arguments have been
put forward to get a handle on whether credit constraints aﬀect educational choices.
Cameron and Heckman (1998, 2001) find that the estimated eﬀects of family background on
college attendance diminishes when scholastic ability is controlled for, suggesting that ability,
rather than financial resources, determines college attendance.1 This indicates that family back-
ground plays a role through its long-run eﬀects on children’s development including cognitive
skills, not through short-term borrowing constraints. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) discuss the
strength of other indirect evidence that has been put forward and conclude that this evidence
is, in fact, often uninformative about credit constraints.
Insight into the question of the importance of credit constraints may also be obtained from
the empirical literature on intergenerational mobility. Using US data, and exploiting information
1See also Mayer (1997) who uses several diﬀerent approaches to get a handle on the eﬀect of parental income
on children’s outcomes.
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about expected financial transfers, Mulligan (1997) has recently argued that the evidence on
intergenerational mobility does not lend strong support to the notion of significant borrowing
constraints. A cross-country comparison of intergenerational mobility further reinforces the
puzzle; from the sketchy evidence that is available it would appear that the correlation between
fathers’ and sons’ long-run incomes is similar in the US and the UK, lying somewhere around
0.4 to 0.5 (Solon, 1999, and Dearden, Machin and Reed, 1997). Sweden, on the other hand,
appears to have higher mobility than the US (Björklund and Jäntti, 1997),2 while Checchi,
Ichino and Rustichini (1999) have argued that Italy has lower mobility than the US. Since both
the Italian and the Swedish educational system are primarily public, financed through taxation,
thus reducing the privately borne cost of education, one would expect both countries to exhibit
relatively high mobility. This suggests that there may be other important institutional features
in an economy aﬀecting intergenerational mobility.
A few studies have also tried to identify what changes, if any, in intergenerational mobility
have accompanied the observed increase in inequality. For the US, Mayer and Lopoo (2001)
and Fertig (2001) have found some evidence of increasing mobility. On the other hand, for the
UK, Blanden et al. (2002) have found a striking decrease in intergenerational mobility in the
recent decades, which they partly attribute to a strengthened connection between education
and parental income.
The connection between parental income and children’s economic success may, however, not
only be due to financial constraints. It could e.g. be that children to rich parents grow up in
advantageous social environments.3 This insight has spawned a growing theoretical literature
that looks at the causes and consequences of endogenous segregation when the social environ-
ment aﬀects the human capital accumulation process. In this vein, the current paper shares
Benabou’s (1993) focus on the role of local and global interaction for stratification and educa-
tional choices. Benabou focuses on the simultaneous choice of education and residential choice,
with local spillovers in education making those acquiring skills willing to pay to reside together.
In contrast, in our framework youngsters choose education taking their locations (determined
by the locational choices made by their parents) as given. In this respect our approach is more
similar to Benabou (1996) who considers an model where parents, who diﬀer in some character-
2See also the survey in Björklund and Jäntti (2000).
3See e.g. Blanden et al. (2002) for a discussion of diﬀerent channels and the problems of empirically identifying
direct and indirect channels.
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istic, choose communities, and where a child’s educational achievement depends on the parent’s
characteristic, on quality of the locally financed education, and on the composition of the com-
munity. Benabou examines various possible types of generic complementarities and shows how
complementarities can amplify initial diﬀerences and make inequality more persistent across
generations. Durlauf (1996) considers a model with endogenous sorting into communities where
a child’s educational achievement depends on locally financed education, the social environment,
and on luck. Durlauf’s main focus is on how endogenous segregation can generate persistent
poverty. Our paper diﬀers from the above mentioned papers in a couple of ways. First, while
the above-mentioned papers assume perfect labour markets, in our analysis labour market im-
perfections and labour markets institutions is the key driving force generating spillover eﬀects.
Second, while in Benabou (1996) and Durlauf (1996) a key feedback mechanism from local social
environment to individual choices is provided by local education finance (determined by some
political mechanism). This is not the case in our model.
The current paper focuses on a particular role played by the social environment, namely its
role in job search activities. A growing body of literature has documented the importance of
social networks in finding employment (Granovetter, 1995 and Corcoran et al., 1989). From a
stratification and intergenerational mobility point of view, the role of social networks in job-
finding processes is a potentially important, but hitherto fairly undeveloped, idea. From a
cross-country point of view, the structure of the flow of information in labour markets can be
expected to diﬀer; e.g. public employment agencies appear to play a smaller role in the US
than in many European countries.4 Legislation also varies across countries; an extreme case is
Sweden where employers are, in order to facilitate job-search, required to notify the National
Labour-Market Board about any vacancies created, suggesting that comparatively few jobs may
be allocated through social networks (Korpi, 2001).
In this paper we present a simple stylized model in which labour-market institutions — in
particular, the mode of dissemination of information about scarce job-opportunities — constitute
a driving force creating endogenous stratification and income correlation across generations. In
the model, young individuals decide whether or not to acquire skills; however, due to imper-
fections in the labour market, skilled jobs are eﬀectively being rationed. Information about
4 Indeed, the research to date seems to have generated a widespread pessimism concerning the eﬃcacy of U.S.
public employment services (see e.g. Holzer, 1988) while the British findings give a more favourable picture of
the public employment service (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996).
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job opportunities are spread by word-of-mouth communication, implying that an individual is
more likely to hear about an opening in a skilled job if he has many skilled workers in his local
environment. This generates a lower expected return to skill-acquisition for individuals from
adverse social environments, making them less likely to invest in education. Based on the in-
come obtained during working life, an individual then chooses a residential area, which defines
the social environment of the individual’s oﬀspring. Using this setup we find that, while there
always exists an equilibrium in which stratification does not occur, there may also exist equi-
libria with asymmetric or “stratified” communities. Equilibria with asymmetric communities
are, however, never strictly superior from a social-optimality point of view; in addition, such
equilibria will have lower intergenerational mobility than a non-stratified outcome.
The model allows us to consider the eﬀects of various factors both on the existence of
stratified equilibria and on behaviour starting from such equilibria. We find that factors that
generally encourage participation in education can be inherently destabilizing, making strati-
fied equilibria more likely to result, while reduced labour-market distortions and less reliance on
word-of-mouth communication can stabilize a non-stratified equilibrium. Similarly, if the econ-
omy starts from a stratified equilibrium, the response to factors that generally tend to encourage
human-capital investments may be highly asymmetric across local communities. In particular,
we find that the negative global spillover eﬀect that occurs since skilled workers from diﬀerent
communities meet in a common labour market can potentially overturn the positive incentive
eﬀects of e.g. a higher wage return to education and/or lower costs of education, potentially
leading to increased diﬀerences in education and lower intergenerational social mobility. On
the other hand, a policy that promotes equal opportunities in the labour market (strengthening
“meritocracy”) can enhance both eﬃciency and social mobility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model. Section III characterizes
steady-state equilibria. Section IV looks at the sustainability of non-stratified equilibrium. Sec-
tion V takes a closer look at stratified equilibria in terms of their comparative statics properties,
intergenerational social mobility, and eﬃciency. Finally, Section VI discusses the findings.
II The Model
Time is continuous and the horizon is infinite. An individual’s lifetime has two phases: a
working-life phase of length T and retirement phase (the length of which is irrelevant). Each
individual belongs to a family characterized by overlapping generations: when an individual
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reaches retirement, her oﬀspring enters working life. During working life the individual works
and saves her earnings (consumption occurs only in retirement); her objective is to maximize
total expected discounted earnings. There is a single numeraire consumption good in the econ-
omy.
A frequent succession of cohorts are born into the economy, each cohort being a continuum
of unit size. A new cohort is born every T/N period, where N is a large natural number. Hence
there is a total measure of N families, each with one member in the labour market. (Every
family has a member only in each N th cohort.) We assume that there are two exogenously
given intrinsically identical locations, each containing N/2 single-family houses; this will imply
that each generation is split equally between the two locations. Workers may move at the point
in time when they retire only, and this location choice determines the social environment of
their oﬀspring; this is the only substantive link between parent and oﬀspring in that there are
no other bequests and no parental investments.
There are two types of jobs in the economy: “good” jobs and “bad” jobs. While good jobs
can only be filled by skilled workers, bad jobs can be filled by any worker. Good jobs, are
however, eﬀectively rationed due to an incentive problem (described in detail below). A young
individual, before entering the labour market, must decide whether or not to acquire skills. The
cost of education has two components: a financial cost (e.g. a “tuition fee”) plus an eﬀort cost.
There is a perfectly functioning credit market on which an agent can borrow to pay the tuition
fee. The individuals, however, vary in “aptitude” or “talent”, making the eﬀort cost vary in the
population. Due to the perfect credit market, we can combine the financial cost and eﬀort cost
into a single measure of an individual’s idiosyncratic cost of education θ. We assume that θ is
independent across identical individuals in the population, drawn from a distribution G with
support
£
θ, θ
¤
. In particular, talent is not transmitted from parent to oﬀspring, and parents
make their location choices unaware of their oﬀspring’s cost of education.
While education takes place locally within each community, workers meet in a common
labour market; this creates scope for global (or “inter-community”) spillovers. Global spillovers
occur through the process by which information about job-openings is disseminated. A fraction
of the attractive good jobs are allocated through connections. A skilled job-seeker may hear
about a job-opening from another skilled “neighbor” (as described below), making the individ-
ual’s expected returns to education depend in part on the composition of her local community.
An individual cannot, however, choose her local community; this is determined by her parent’s
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locational choice. Next we describe various components of the model in greater detail, starting
with a description of the labour market.
Job Creation and Job-Finding Rates
A worker’s productivity in a good job (for which skills are necessary) is constant equal to wH
while her productivity in an bad job is wL (irrespectively of her skills); wH > wL. Bad jobs are
always available to any worker who wants one; firms oﬀering these jobs act competitively and
pay the competitive wage wL. Good jobs on the other hand may, due to an incentive problem,
not be immediately available. There is on-the-job search in the sense that a skilled worker
can work in a bad job while searching.5 Once a worker finds a good job there are no natural
separations so she can continue to work in that job until retirement. There is a separate job
market for each cohort.
Following Saint-Paul (2001) we assume that a worker in a good job can try to access a
“stealing technology”. She might be caught trying, but if she is successful she can steal an
amount h (at no risk) from the firm at every moment until retirement. A worker belonging to
a given cohort is characterized by an age t ∈ [0, T ]; we will consider a given cohort since good
jobs will be age specific. We want to find the job-creation rate at each age that is compatible
with a worker in a good job not misbehaving; under the assumption of free entry by firms, this
will be the equilibrium job-creation rate, along with the competitive wage wH .6
It is useful to derive value functions measuring expected discounted future earnings. Let
V N (τ) denote the value of being employed in a good job not trying to steal with τ ≡ T − t
time left in the labour market. Trivially, for all τ ∈ [0, T ],
V N (τ) =
wH
r
¡
1− e−rτ
¢
, (1)
where r is the interest rate. Let V T (τ) denote the value of trying to access the stealing
technology with τ time left in the labour market. V T (·) satisfies the asset equation
rV T (τ) = wH + q
£
V S (τ)− V T (τ)
¤
+ p
£
U (τ)− V T (τ)
¤
− V˙ T (τ) , (2)
for all τ ∈ [0, T ] where V S (τ) is the value of having access to the stealing technology, U (τ) is
the value of being fired, q is the probability of accessing the stealing technology, and p is the
5The current model is in this sense similar to the “dual” labour market model in Bulow and Summers (1986).
6See e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
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probability of being caught trying. V S (τ) is similar to V N (τ) (with wH + h in place of wH)
while U (τ) satisfies the asset equation
rU (τ) = wL + a (τ)
£
V N (τ)− U (τ)
¤
− U˙ (τ) , (3)
where a (τ) is the rate at which the worker finds another good job. The equilibrium job-creation
adjusts so as to keep the “no-trying condition” V N (τ) ≥ V T (τ) satisfied with equality for all
τ > 0. In order for some job creation to take place we assume that ∆w ≡ wH − wL > qh/p.
Substituting for V S (·) and V T (·) in (2) gives
U (τ) =
·
wH −
q
p
h
¸
1
r
¡
1− e−rτ
¢
. (4)
Equation (3) can then be used to solve for the job-finding rate, a (τ) = rK/ (1− e−rτ ), where
K ≡ p
qh
µ
∆w − q
p
h
¶
=
p
q
∆w
h
− 1 > 0. (5)
The constant K measures inversely the labour-market distortion: the larger is K the more rapid
is job-creation. Naturally, K is decreasing in h and q, and increasing in p and ∆w.
Since each agent’s lifetime is finite we can focus on the limiting case where there is no
discounting. The job-finding rate at age t, denoted a (t), then becomes7
a (t) =
K
T − t for all t ∈ [0, T ) . (6)
Let F (·) denote the probability of finding a good job at age t or sooner associated with the
hazard rate a (·); this is easily seen to be8
F (t) = 1−
µ
T − t
T
¶K
for all t ∈ [0, T ] . (7)
The incentive problem determines the rehiring rate for a job-loser (i.e. a worker who has
been fired after being caught misbehaving).9 Thus we need to relate this rehiring rate to the
hiring rates of “first-job-seekers”. The latter rates may however be community-specific. Hence
let Nj (t) denote the number of skilled job-seekers of age t in location j, and let aj (t) denote
the rate at which these workers find good jobs. The labour market distortion creates eﬀective
7Note that we are abusing the notation slightly here by “reversing time”; a (t) is obtained from a (τ) as
a (t) ≡ limr→0
h
rK/
³
1− e−r(T−t)
´i
.
8Note that F (t) goes to unity as t goes to T , indicating that the worker will, with probability one, find a good
job before reaching retirement.
9This is a common, but often implicit, feature of eﬃciency-wage model of unemployment.
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“job rationing” when a job-loser cannot easily be distinguished from initial job-seekers. In
order to capture the spirit of this we assume that a job-loser becomes indistinguishable from
an “average” first-job seeker in his cohort in the sense that her rehiring rate equals the average
hiring rate among the current first-job seekers.10
Assumption 1 For all t ∈ [0, T ],
a (t) =
P
j=1,2Nj (t) aj (t)P
j=1,2Nj (t)
.
Using this assumption we can show that the number of good jobs created, at any age t,
depends only on the number of skilled workers in the cohort, not on their composition in terms
of social background.
Proposition 1 The number of good jobs created for workers of age t, denoted M (t), is, for
all t ∈ [0, T ), proportional to the number of skilled workers in the relevant cohort.
The creation of good jobs for a given cohort is thus spread out over the entire period in
which that cohort is in the labour market. In particular, the time of creation of a typical good
job (as measured from the date at which the cohort enters the labour market) is a random
variable drawn from the distribution F (·). Note that this implies an expected time of creation
equal to t0 ≡ T/ (1 +K).
Social Environment and Word-of-Mouth Communication
Each worker’s local environment is determined by the residential choice of her parent. In
particular, each community is characterized by a social environment, measured in terms of the
skills of the workers living in that community. Let γj , j = 1, 2, denote the fraction of workers
(of working age) in location j who are skilled. We will be focusing on steady-state equilibria
and will hence treat γ1 and γ2 as constant over time.
One aspect of labour-market institutions is how information about job-openings is dissem-
inated. To explore this we will assume that information about (a fraction of) the good jobs
created is spread through word-of-mouth communication among skilled workers. We will show
10This implies that all job-losers become identical independently of their backgrounds. This simplifies the
analysis in that the incentive condition will be the same for all workers in good jobs. Of course, in equilibrium,
there will be no job-losers.
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here that, under some simplifying assumptions, this leads to local job-finding hazards for good
jobs that stand in constant proportion to each other.11
To do this we need to impose some spatial structure on the two locations. Recall that
each location consists of N/2 single-family houses. All houses are assumed to be symmetrically
distributed in the sense that each family has n immediate “neighbors”. Assuming that each
family’s neighbors are representative of the community, each skilled job-seeker in community
j then has nγj skilled neighbors. In order to derive the implications of the word-of-mouth
communication process, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 2 (Word-of-mouth communication)
1. Information about good jobs can only be passed on between immediate neighbors.
2. There is no “relay” of information: information can only be passed on once.
3. Each skilled worker in the economy (whether currently in a good job or not) is equally
likely to hear about any good job that is created.
4. Since vacancies are age-specific, the probability that a skilled worker who is first to hear
about a specific vacancy will need it for herself, or will have more than one relevant neigh-
bor to pass it on to, is negligible.
The number of good jobs created for age-t skilled job seekers is M (t). Assume for now
that all good jobs are allocated through word-of-mouth communication. Consider then the
probability that a specific job-seekers, of age t, in location j gets one of these M (t) jobs. Note
that
P
i=1,2Ni (t)nγi is the total number of skilled individuals who know some age-t job-seeking
skilled worker; each of these individuals is equally likely to be the one who passes the information
about any one of the M (t) job-openings on to a worker who finally fills that specific vacancy.
But the age-t job-seeker in location j knows nγj of the potential information carriers; hence her
job-finding hazard is simply
aj (t) =
nγjM (t)
n
P
i=1,2Ni (t) γi
. (8)
11Our model of informal dissemination of information about job-openings can be viewed as a highly simplified
version of the model in Calvo-Armengol and Zenou (2001).
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The important property to note is that the local hazards stand in constant proportion to each
other: for all t ≥ 0,
a1 (t)
a2 (t)
=
γ1
γ2
. (9)
The relevant measure of the local social environment is thus the proportion of skilled workers
γj in the location, and what matters for the allocation of good jobs is the relative proportion
γ1/γ2. Intuitively, when there are more skilled workers in community 1 than in community
2, skilled worker from community 1 tend to find good jobs faster then their community-2
counterparts.
In order to be able to explore the role of labour market institutions we will however assume
that some good jobs are formally advertised. While the chance of a worker getting an informally
advertised job depends on her (relative) social environment as described above, all skilled job-
seekers have an equal chance of getting a formally advertised job. To capture this we include
a parameter υ ∈ [0, 1] to measure how many good jobs are allocated informally and generalize
(9) to
a1 (t)
a2 (t)
= (1− υ) + υγ1
γ2
≡ ϕ. (10)
The special case υ = 1 is the case where all good jobs are informally allocated, while υ = 0 is
the case where all good jobs are formally allocated.
Local Complementarities in Human Capital Investments and Educational
Choices
A social environment may impact both on the cost of and the return to education. The mecha-
nism described above, where an agent with more skilled neighbors is more likely to hear about
job-openings, works through the expected return to education. Note that this is a global (or
“inter-community”) spillover eﬀect in the sense that a worker in one community is aﬀected
by the social environment in the adjacent community. We will also allow the social environ-
ment to aﬀect the agent’s cost of education through a local human-capital spillover eﬀect: in
each community, the more people acquire skills, the easier/less costly it is to invest in educa-
tion. There are several reasons why there might be local complementarities in human capital
investments: fiscal externalities, scale economies, peer group eﬀects etc. Though this local
(or “intra-community”) spillover eﬀect is not essential to the main results regarding eﬃciency
properties of symmetric communities and the importance of formal versus word-of-mouth com-
munication, we include it since it interacts with the global spillover eﬀect in an interesting way.
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We want, for example, to consider whether local spillovers in human capital investments tend
to stabilize or destabilize a non-stratified outcome in the presence of global spillovers.
Hence we assume that an agent’s eﬀective cost of education is lower when a larger fraction
of the individuals in his community also invest in education. Thus let the eﬀective cost of
education to an individual from community j, with idiosyncratic cost θ, be θπ(γj), where γj
is the fraction of workers from the same community (and cohort) who also invest in education;
the function π(·) is assumed to be continuous and decreasing with π(0) = 1 and π(1) > 0.
Let us now consider the incentives for investing in education. Each young worker takes his
location, the social environments, and the behaviour of everyone else as given. First we need
to verify that the social environments, γ1 and γ2, generate well-defined community-specific job-
finding prospects. To that end, let Fj (t), t ∈ [0, T ] denote the probability that a skilled worker
in location j finds a good job prior to age t.
Lemma 2 Given that, in every cohort, a fraction γj > 0 of the workers in community j, j =
1, 2, invest in education, F1 (·) and F2 (·), are uniquely identified, and satisfy [1− F1 (t)] =
[1− F2 (t)]ϕ for all t ∈ [0, T ]. If γj = 0, then Fk (·) = F (·).
This makes clear the role of the social environments for job-finding prospects: if there are
more skilled workers in community j than in community k, that is, if γj > γk (and some good
jobs are informally allocated), then Fk (·) < F (·) < Fj (·), implying that Fk (·) stochastically
dominates Fj (·).12 Thus a skilled worker from community k is disadvantaged relative to a
worker from community j; since she has relatively few skilled workers in her local environment
she can expect to wait longer to find a good job. Let tj = tj
¡
γj , γk
¢
denote the expected time
a skilled worker in community j must wait before she finds a good job; it then follows that
γj ≥ γk implies tj ≤ tk.
Consider then the educational choice of a worker in community j with idiosyncratic cost
θ (and hence eﬀective cost π
¡
γj
¢
θ). If she remains unskilled her lifetime earnings will be
TwL; if, on the other hand, she invests in education, her expected lifetime earnings will be
TwH − (wH − wL) tj . Hence, she will make the investment if and only if:
θ < θj ≡
∆w
π(γj)
¡
T − tj
¡
γj , γk
¢¢
. (11)
If more workers invest in education in community j than in community k, then an indi-
vidual young worker in community j has a stronger incentive to invest in education than an
12The fact that F (·) is “in between” follows from (A4) in the Appendix.
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identical young worker in the other community. Note that this is true even if there are no local
complementarities in education. While any local complementarity implies that a young worker
in community j has a lower cost of education, the social network eﬀect implies that he also has
a higher expected return than his community-k counterpart.
Prior to realization of a worker’s idiosyncratic education cost θ, her expected lifetime income
(net of any idiosyncratic educational cost incurred), denoted z, is community-specific:
zj ≡
Z θ
θ
max
©
TwL, TwH −∆wtj
¡
γj , γk
¢
− θπ
¡
γj
¢ª
g (θ) dθ, j = 1, 2. (12)
From the above discussion it follows immediately that γj > γk implies that zj > zk.
Locational Choices
Whenever the proportions of educated workers diﬀer across communities, the community with
the higher proportion will constitute a more favorable social environment. This creates the
potential for a self-reinforcing feedback where the superiority of one community persists due to
the education incentives coming with a better environment, and thus a potential for sorting.
Sorting into communities may occur for many diﬀerent reasons. Similar feedbacks may be
transmitted through e.g. local public-good provision or crime rates. Also, if one community is
intrinsically more attractive, self-reinforcing feedbacks may be magnified.
In the model, location choice is irrelevant for the determination of equilibrium; the social
environment is the only diﬀerence between communities. This property depends on parents
not passing on anything but the place of birth to their children in the model — all children are
identical at the point in time when parents choose location (parents do not provide any input in
the children’s investments in education, they leave no financial bequests, they do not themselves
provide any job information, and talent is not genetically transmitted). Location choice matters,
however, in that it determines the intergenerational mobility in each equilibrium.
Given that the communities may diﬀer in social environment, and given that social envi-
ronment is a key determinant of a child’s prospects, one natural way in which sorting into
communities will occur is if parents care about the future prospects of their oﬀspring, as mea-
sured e.g. by the net expected lifetime earnings, z. A more favorable location will then naturally
command a higher rental price; any mild complementarity between own consumption and con-
cern for the oﬀspring will induce stratification by income: parents with realized incomes in the
upper half of the aggregate income distribution will outbid the parents with incomes in the
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lower half of the income distribution for the houses in the attractive location. We seek a spec-
ification that captures this without interfering with the eﬃciency-wage model in uninteresting
ways. In the interest of tractability, we simply assume that individuals sort by income; one
way of motivating this is by assuming that individuals are lexicographically altruistic (for their
oﬀspring) and that bargaining power in side-contracting in the housing market is aligned with
income rank.13
Local and Aggregate Income Distributions
Before turning to steady-state equilibria, we show that a time-invariant skill distribution maps
into two local (lifetime) income distributions, Φ1 and Φ2, and a global income distribution Φ.
Thus suppose that a fraction γj of the workers in location j invest in education (in every cohort).
The support of Φj is [TwL, TwH ]. For every possible realization of lifetime earnings y in this
support, Φj (y) has two parts: the probability that a randomly chosen agent in community j
remains unskilled (which has probability 1 − γj), and the probability that the agent invests
in education but earns less than y. Calculating the conditional probability of the latter event
using the local distribution of job-finding dates Fj (·), we obtain that the distribution of lifetime
earnings among the workers in community j is
Φj (y) = 1− γjFj
µ
TwH − y
∆w
¶
. (13)
Since half of each cohort is born into each community, the economy-wide income distribution,
denoted Φ, is simply Φ = (Φ1 +Φ2) /2. Moreover, since F1 and F2 are uniquely determined by
γ1 and γ2 (Lemma 2) so are the income distributions, Φ1, Φ2, and Φ.
13A somewhat more realistic and somewhat more cumbersome road is to e.g. assume that a parent’s preferences
over own consumption and the child’s prospects are czα, where α > 0. Let ρj be the rental price in area j, and
suppose e.g. that γ1 > γ2. The locational choice of an individual with realized lifetime income y can be described
as j∗ (y) = argmaxj
©¡
y − ρj
¢
zαj
ª
which is monotonic in y for any α > 0. If α is small the equilibrium rental
prices must be close, and moreover, the indirect utility of lifetime income,
³
y − ρj∗(y)
´
zαj∗(y) becomes eﬀectively
linear which is consistent with assumption that the agents maximize lifetime earnings during working life. This
story, however, depends on parents not knowing the education cost of their oﬀspring at the point in time when
they choose location.
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III Steady-State Equilibrium
So far we have taken the fractions of skilled workers in the two communities as given and shown
how γ1 and γ2 determine (i) job creation, (ii) local job-finding rates, and (iii) local and aggregate
income distributions. However, we have not required that γ1 and γ2 be consistent with rational
education choices. A worker in community j will only invest in education if he is talented
enough so that θ < θj , defined in (11). The fraction of agents in community j acquiring skills
will then be γj = G(θj). Rationality and consistency can therefore succinctly be summarized
in the following two equilibrium conditions:
γj = G
µ
∆w
π(γj)
¡
T − tj
¡
γj , γk
¢¢¶
, j, k = 1, 2, j 6= k. (14)
In words, (14) says that the educational choices of the agents in each community should be
consistent with the incentives created by the social environments — in both communities — that
those educational choices generate. From now on we will refer to a pair (γ1, γ2) that solves (14)
for j = 1 and j = 2 simultaneously as a steady-state equilibrium.
It is useful to define a conditional community equilibrium as a γj that solves (14) for a given
γk ∈ [0, 1]. Uniqueness is implied by the following “within-group stability condition” which we
take to hold throughout: for all γj ∈ [0, 1],
π0(γj)θ
¡
γj
¢
+
π
¡
γj
¢
g(θ(γj))
+∆w
∂tj
∂γj
> 0, (15)
where θ
¡
γj
¢
= θj ≡ G−1
¡
γj
¢
is the cut-oﬀ education cost of the last individual to invest in
education.14 We can then write the conditional community equilibrium as a continuous function
γj (γk) and characterize a steady-state equilibrium as a pair (γ1, γ2) for which γj = γj (γk) for
j, k = 1, 2 simultaneously.
There may exist two types of steady-state equilibria: symmetric (or “non-stratified”) and
asymmetric (or “stratified”). While asymmetric equilibria may or may not exist, there always
exists exactly one symmetric equilibrium, henceforth denoted by ∗, the proportion of work-
ers with an education in each community being γ∗. Moreover, the symmetric equilibrium is
independent of the way information about good jobs is disseminated.
14The condition guarantees that the derivative of the right-hand side of (14) not exceeds one, which corresponds
to a local expansion of education not being self-reinforcing absent adjustment in the other community. The
condition involves local and the global spillover eﬀects, and rules out the local externality being too strong.
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Proposition 3 There exists exactly one symmetric steady state equilibrium γ∗, which is inde-
pendent of υ, and which has tj = t0 ≡ T/ (1 +K) for j = 1, 2.
In the symmetric equilibrium the two communities oﬀer exactly the same social environment;
hence, individuals in both locations behave in the same way, and no parent is willing to pay
more to live in one community than in the other. Another feature of the symmetric equilibrium
is that there is perfect intergenerational mobility: there is zero correlation between the lifetime
income of a child and that of her parent.15
However, non-stratified communities is not the only possibility. Intuitively, there can be
stable outcomes where one community oﬀers a more favorable social environment and, as a
consequence, young people are more prone to invest in education there, thus perpetuating the
diﬀerence in the social environments. The scope for stratification stems from the fact that the
workers from the two communities meet in a common labour market; global spillover eﬀects arise
since the local social environments in both communities aﬀect the prospects of young workers in
each of the two communities. To gain further insight into the global spillover, consider how the
local “waiting times” t1 and t2 are aﬀected by marginal increases in γ1 and γ2. An increase in γj
has two eﬀects. First, it improves the set of connections that a young worker in community j can
use to find a good job; this eﬀect comes at the expense of the other community and hence tends
to reduce tj and increase tk. Second, when γj increases, the total number of skilled workers in
the economy increases; the firms respond to this by creating equally many new jobs. However,
the new jobs are created with an average waiting time of t0; if human capital investments are
increasing in the relatively disadvantaged community — i.e. if initially γj < γk — the expected
waiting time for the newly created jobs is shorter than tj , allowing all skilled workers to find
good jobs, on average, faster, thus reducing both tj and tk. If, on the other hand, human-capital
investments are increasing in the already advantaged community — i.e. if initially γj > γk —
this eﬀect goes in the opposite direction, increasing both tj and tk. The thing to note is that
the eﬀect of expanding human-capital investments in either community on the disadvantaged
community is always unambiguous.
Lemma 4 If γj ≤ γk, then ∂tj/∂γj < 0 and ∂tj/∂γk > 0, while if γj > γk both eﬀects are
ambiguous.
15To see this note that since the communities are identical the local income distributions are the same Φj = Φ,
j = 1, 2; moreover, the child’s and the parent’s incomes are independent draws from Φ. Since independence
implies zero covariance, the incomes are uncorrelated.
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The eﬀect of the global spillovers is also easy to see from the conditional community equi-
libria, γj (·). Suppose e.g. that fewer (more) than γ∗ workers invest in education in community
k; the rational response is then for more (fewer) than γ∗ workers to invest in education in com-
munity j.16 See Figure 1. Note that γj (0) = γ∗ since, when no one invests in human capital in
community k, the expected waiting time for skilled workers in community j is necessarily t0.
Figure 1 here
As the figure makes clear, the number of steady-state equilibria will always be odd: if (γ1, γ2)
is an equilibrium, its mirror image is also an equilibrium. Hence we can focus on equilibria where
γ1 ≥ γ2. Moreover, even though there can be more than three equilibria, these cases are both
implausible and less interesting; hence from now on we restrict attention to cases where there
are at most three equilibria.
Stability
Our notion of stability is the standard one based on the reaction functions, viz. the one requir-
ing that a myopic adjustment process with the γ’s being adjusted alternately converge to the
equilibrium.17 The following Lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 5 A symmetric equilibrium is locally stable if and only if
∂γj
∂γk
=
−∆w∂tj/∂γk
π0
¡
γj
¢
θj + π
¡
γj
¢
/g(θj) +∆w∂tj/∂γj
> −1 (16)
at γj = γk = γ∗.
16This follows from Lemma 5, and from noting that γk 6= γ∗, γk 6= 0 implies γj (γk) 6= γ∗.
17The out-of-steady-state dynamics of the current model are clearly very complicated. Explicit dynamics can
be studied in simplified versions; suppose e.g. that only two generations of workers — young and old — are present
in the labour market at the same time and that old workers can provide young workers with information about
good jobs (while young workers hear about formally advertised jobs directly). When studying out-of-steady-state
dynamics one needs to consider the (unique) equilibrium behaviour of one cohort conditional on the behaviour of
the previous cohort; this determines the evolution of the economy (which is deterministic). The evolution then
determines steady state equilibria. The simplified model, with explicit dynamics, shares the key properties of
the current model: there is exactly one symmetric steady state equilibrium, and there may be other asymmetric
equilibria. If the symmetric equilibrium is the unique steady state equilibrium, it is stable; if there are three
steady state equilibria, the asymmetric ones are stable, while the symmetric one is unstable.
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It is worth noting that γj(·) slopes downward at the symmetric equilibrium since the nu-
merator is positive by Lemma 4, and the denominator is positive by the within-group stability
condition. Note that, by the expression given in (16) and using Lemma 4, γj(·) slopes downward
when γj < γk; in particular, γ0j (γk) < 0 when γk > γ∗. This, combined with the fact that
γj (0) = γj (γ∗) = γ∗ and the previously noted fact that the number of equilibria is odd, makes
clear that there are precisely two cases when the number of equilibria is a most three:
• The symmetric equilibrium is stable, and it is the unique equilibrium.
• There are two asymmetric equilibria in addition to the symmetric one; the asymmetric
equilibria are stable while the symmetric equilibrium is unstable.
Eﬃciency
Are any of the steady-state equilibria ever eﬃcient? And if not, what are the sources of in-
eﬃciency? Since the individuals’ preferences are linear in consumption, it is natural to use
total surplus, defined as total output minus aggregate education cost, as the eﬃciency criterion.
What then does an eﬃcient allocation look like? And in particular, will having non-identical
communities ever be superior to a symmetric outcome?
The answer to the last question is no. The reason for this is simple. Since the creation
of good jobs is proportional to the total number of skilled workers in each cohort, aggregate
production is linear in the aggregate number of skilled workers: the aggregate output of a
cohort is equal to γ
£
TwH −∆wt0
¤
+ (1− γ)TwL, where γ = (γ1 + γ2) /2 is the total number
of skilled workers in that cohort. This implies that there are no gains in terms of output to
having asymmetric communities.
Moreover, since any potential spillovers in education are only local, the cost of educating
a given number of workers in community j is independent of the number of workers acquiring
skills in community k.
Combining these two observations immediately leads us to conclude that there can be no
eﬃciency gains from having asymmetric communities.
Proposition 6 There is always an eﬃcient allocation in which the communities are symmetric.
This result does not require any convexity assumption. Convexity of the cost of educating γ
workers within a community would ensure the existence of a unique eﬃcient allocation, which
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then by Proposition 6 is symmetric: denote the cost of educating a fraction γ of a community’s
cohort (measured per community member in the relevant cohort) as
C (γ) ≡ π (γ)
Z θ(γ)
θ
θg (θ) dθ, (17)
where as before θ (γ) = G−1 (γ). This cost is convex if
C 00 (γ) = π00 (γ)
Z θ(γ)
θ
θg (θ) dθ + 2π0 (θ) θ (γ) +
π (γ)
g (θ (γ))
> 0. (18)
Here we see that two factors in particular tend to make C(·) convex. Decreasing returns to the
local spillover in education — π00 > 0 being large relative to absolute value of π0 < 0 — is one
such factor. The other is when there is large variability in talent, implying that the density
g (·) is small; generally, the larger is the dispersion in talent, the more likely is it that the
marginal cost of educating additional workers will be increasing. Note that if there are no local
complementarities in education (i.e. π (γ) = 1 for all γ) then C (·) is always strictly convex due
to the variation is talent.
If there are local complementarities in education, then not even the symmetric equilibrium
γ∗ will be eﬃcient. This is the standard externality that a worker does not take into account
the eﬀect of his education decision on the education costs for the other cohort members in his
community. This is, however, the only ineﬃciency of the symmetric equilibrium.
A stratified equilibrium will generally involve a second ineﬃciency: given that C(·) is convex
the aggregate cost of educating a total fraction γ of the workers in a cohort is minimized by
educating the same fraction in both communities, γ1 = γ2 = γ. Hence, on top of the fact that
the number of skilled workers is generally wrong, in an asymmetric equilibrium the aggregate
cost of educating fails to be minimized: the equilibrium number of skilled workers could be
educated more cheaply by ensuring that the marginal students in the two communities are
equally talented.18
IV Sustainability of a Non-Stratified Equilibrium
What factors contribute to making stratified equilibria less likely to be sustainable? Can we
expect factors that promote human-capital acquisition also to promote social integration? A
18When C(·) is not convex, an asymmetric allocation may be optimal — although not uniquely optimal — and
an eﬃcient allocation is not in general characterized by the first-order condition.
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partial answer to this question can be obtained by considering in detail the stability of the sym-
metric equilibrium. We will show that, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, factors that generally
encourage investments in human capital can be inherently destabilizing, thus contributing to
making social stratification more likely.
In order to sort out the forces at work in determining the stability of the symmetric equi-
librium — and thus the number of equilibria — it is useful to make the following simplifying
assumptions.
Assumption 3 The distribution of θ is uniform on [0, A], for some A > 0, and the local exter-
nality of the number of educated workers in a location implies exponentially decaying education
costs, i.e., π0(γ)/π(γ) = −a, for some constant a ≥ 0.
With the uniform distribution for θ the (constant) density is g = 1/A. The substance of
assuming that θ is uniformly distributed is that we rule out eﬀects stemming from the density
function being increasing or decreasing locally.19
Recall that the symmetric equilibrium is stable if and only if
¯¯
∂γj/∂γk
¯¯
< 1 (at γ∗). We
will therefore say that a factor destabilizes (stabilizes) the symmetric equilibrium if it, ceteris
paribus, increases (decreases)
¯¯
∂γj/∂γk
¯¯
.
With a uniform distribution and no local spillovers (i.e. a = 0), the stability of the symmetric
equilibrium is independent of γ∗, the number of workers acquiring education. However, when
there are local complementarities in education, then the scale of the symmetric equilibrium
matters; in particular, the larger is γ∗ the less likely it is that the symmetric equilibrium is
stable — an increase in γ∗ directly increases
¯¯
∂γj/∂γk
¯¯
. This raises the possibility that some
factors may aﬀect the stability of the symmetric equilibrium only through its eﬀect on its scale;
as we will see shortly, this is true for the wage return, ∆w, which increases γ∗. We can thus
conclude, for example, that an increase in the wage return will aﬀect stability only if there are
local spillovers, and will then aﬀect it negatively (see Proposition 7 below).
We will label eﬀects that occur via γ∗ as “scale eﬀects”, and refer to the direct eﬀect on¯¯
∂γj/∂γk
¯¯
as the “sensitivity eﬀect” (reflecting that the impact is via the responsiveness of γj
to γk and vice versa). The factors that we will consider are:
19As we have seen — for example, in the within-group stability condition (15) — a small value of the density at
the equilibrium serves to stabilize the equilibrium; similarly, it turns out that a locally increasing density leads
to any increase in the number of workers acquiring education having a destabilizing eﬀect.
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1. A reduction in education cost, represented by an increase of the (constant) density g.20
2. An increase in the wage return, represented by an increase in ∆w (holding the speed of
creation of good jobs fixed21); note that since the wages reflect underlying technologies,
an increase in ∆w may be interpreted as a “skill-biased” technological change.
3. A decrease in the labour market distortion, represented by an increase in K, which leads
to faster creation of good jobs.
4. A strengthening of the local education spillovers, represented by an increase in a.
5. An increase in the fraction of jobs that are allocated through social networks, represented
by an increase in υ.
We can summarize the unambiguous eﬀects as follows.
Proposition 7 Stronger local spillovers (a) and larger reliance on word-of-mouth communica-
tion (υ) are always destabilizing; when a > 0 reduced education costs (an increase in g) and a
higher wage return (∆w for fixed K) are destabilizing too.
That the importance of informal job allocation, υ, is destabilizing is due solely to the sen-
sitivity eﬀect (since υ does not aﬀect the scale γ∗).22 The eﬀect of the wage return ∆w is due
solely to the scale eﬀect (which is why it only occurs when there are local spillovers in educa-
tion). The eﬀect of reduced education costs emanates from both channels; both eﬀects vanish,
however, when a = 0. The only ambiguous eﬀect is a decrease in the labour market distortions;
an increase in K leads to faster job creation and an increase in the scale γ∗. But on the other
hand, it also implies shorter waiting times on average, thus indirectly reducing the importance
of social networks and, hence, sensitivity. Hence, K the eﬀect of generally ambiguous, but is
stabilizing when a is zero (or suﬃciently small).
The properties demonstrated underline a recurrent observation, viz. the potential for policies
to have ambiguous eﬀects. In particular, we have seen that education is generally underprovided
20 I.e., we simply scale down the interval [0, A] over which θ is uniformly distributed; this corresponds to each
worker’s education cost being reduced proportionally by a factor common to all workers.
21Note that ∆w enters as a determinant of K, which determines the speed of creation of good jobs. Thus we
ignore this channel and treat an increase in K separately.
22Moreover, the conclusion concerning υ does not require Assumption 3.
20
in equilibrium, which calls for policies that promote education; such policies may, however, upset
a symmetric equilibrium leading to ineﬃcient — and otherwise undesirable — segregation.
V Eﬀects on a Stratified Equilibrium
The analysis of the stability of the symmetric equilibrium provided us with some insight into
what factors avert social stratification. We now proceed to consider whether the same factors
that permit stratified equilibria also make such equilibria in some sense more polarized. We
maintain Assumption 3 since it oﬀers us a simple parameterization of education costs and of
local education spillovers. Our starting point is thus the existence of a stratified equilibrium
with γ1 > γ2, and our first concern is how various factors aﬀect investments in human capital
as measured by γ1 and γ2.
As in the case of stability, we will be interested in the eﬀect of a number of factors: a reduc-
tion in education costs (represented by an increase in g), an increase in the wage return to skill
∆w (ignoring the eﬀect via job creation), a decrease in labour market distortions (represented
by an increase in K) leading to faster creation of good jobs, a strengthening of local education
spillovers (represented by an increase in a), and an increase in the fraction of good jobs that
are allocated through word-of-mouth communication (represented by an increase in υ). It is
useful to derive a general expression for the equilibrium eﬀect on γj of a generic parameter α,
α = g,∆w,K, a, υ. Recall that (14) defines the locus of conditional community equilibria γj (·).
Moreover, we know that, γ1 > γ2 implies γ02 (γ1) < 0 while γ01 (γ2) has an ambiguous sign (see
Figure 1). The equilibrium eﬀects on participation in education in the two communities depend
partly on the direct eﬀects on education incentives and partly on global spillovers. Define the
partial or “direct” eﬀect of α on γj , denoted ∂γj/∂α, as the eﬀect on γj that would have ob-
tained had γk remained unchanged (obtained by totally diﬀerentiating (14) while holding γk
fixed). In terms of Figure 1, a positive direct eﬀect, ∂γj/∂α > 0, simply means that γj (·)
shifts upwards locally. Then denote the total eﬀect on the steady-state equilibrium value of γj
— which includes global spillover eﬀects — by dγj/dα. It is then straightforward to show that
dγj
dα
=
1
D
µ∂γj
∂α
+ γ0j (γk)
∂γk
∂α
¶
, j, k = 1, 2, j 6= k, (19)
where D > 0 (given that the equilibrium is locally stable).
We can partition the parameters into two distinct groups according to their direct eﬀects.
The factors that have strictly positive direct eﬀects include (i) a reduction in education costs,
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(ii) an increase in the wage return ∆w, (iii) a reduction in labour market distortions leading to
faster creation of good jobs, or (iv) stronger local spillover eﬀects in education. These factors
thus directly encourage education: ∂γj/∂α > 0 for these factors. However, this does not rule
out asymmetric responses across the two communities. Consider first community 2. For this
community the positive direct eﬀect is counteracted by a strictly negative global spillover eﬀect
from community 1 — the second term in the parenthesis in (19) is strictly negative.
This is due to the fact that an increase in γ1 makes it more diﬃcult for workers in community
2 to find good jobs quickly.
If the direct eﬀect is relatively strong in the advantaged group, and the responsiveness in
community 2 to an increase in γ1 is fairly strong, then the direct eﬀect may by substantially
or completely outweighed by the negative spillover eﬀect. It is interesting to note that the
responsiveness, measured by the slope γ02 (γ1), arises fundamentally from the global spillover
eﬀect due to the workers meeting in a common labour market, but is amplified by any local
complementarities in education.
For the advantaged community 1, the direct positive eﬀect is less likely to be counteracted
by global spillover eﬀects. Indeed, the global spillovers may even reinforce the direct eﬀect for
this group — the second term in (19) may be positive (see Lemma 4).
The reason is that increased education in community 2 leads to equally many good jobs being
created, but at a faster rate than the workers in community 2 find jobs; this eﬀect tends to
allow the skilled workers from community 1 to find good jobs more quickly. Figure 2 illustrates
a case where equilibrium education increases only in the advantaged community.
Figure 2 here
A change in the importance of social contacts in the job-finding process on the other hand
has a markedly diﬀerent eﬀect. Suppose e.g. that the fraction of good jobs that are allocated
through social networks, υ, is increased. The direct eﬀect of this is to make it relatively more
diﬃcult for workers in the community 2 to find good jobs quickly; in particular, the increase in
υ causes t1 to decrease and t2 to increase. This implies that direct eﬀect ∂γj/∂υ is negative for
community 2 and positive for community 1. Since the global spillover eﬀect aﬀecting community
2 is then also strictly negative, the equilibrium eﬀect is to reduce γ2.
Hence we find that factors that generally encourage education have ambiguous eﬀects on
participation in education, with a marked possibility that the educational responses can be
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highly asymmetric across stratified communities. The only factor for which the comparative-
statics eﬀect is unambiguous is an increases in υ, the fraction of jobs that are allocated through
word-of-mouth communication, on participation in education in the disadvantaged community.
(The proof of the following Proposition gives the details of all the above-mentioned results.)
Proposition 8 An increase in the fraction of good jobs that are allocated through social net-
works, υ, unambiguously decreases education in the disadvantaged community.
The analysis highlights how social interaction can potentially account for aggregate educa-
tional responses that may be diﬃcult to explain with an individualistic framework with atom-
istically optimizing agents, especially if credit constraints are unlikely to be binding heavily.
For example, in the current framework factors that generally encourage human-capital accu-
mulation may have the equilibrium eﬀect of making participation in education more polarized
across socio-economic groups.
Eﬀects on Mobility and Eﬃciency
The eﬀects of stratification are also reflected in the degree of intergenerational social mobility. A
simple mobility measure in the current model is the fraction of families that switch from having
above median income in one generation to having below median income in the next (or vice
versa). This is of course also the fraction of families that switch community 1 to community 2.
Denote this fraction by µ and note that it satisfies µ = Φ1 (by) where by is the aggregate median
income.
Since half of each cohort is born in to each community, by must identically satisfy Φ1 (by) +
Φ2 (by) = 1. Consider then the eﬀect of a generic parameter α = g,∆w,K, a, υ on mobility
µ in a stratified equilibrium. Taking into account the impact of α on both the local income
distributions and on the median income we obtain that
∂µ
∂α
=
φ2
φ1 + φ2
∂Φ1
∂α
− φ1
φ1 + φ2
∂Φ2
∂α
, (20)
where φj is the density function of the local income distribution evaluated at by.
This expression shows that an unambiguous eﬀect on mobility would obtain if the local in-
come distributions Φ1 and Φ2 were to move in “opposite directions” (in the first-order stochastic-
dominance sense). The above analysis then suggests that it is quite conceivable that factors
that generally encourage education (e.g. a reduction in education costs, an increase in the wage
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return etc.) may have a negligible or even negative impact on mobility. As noted above, asym-
metric responses with a stronger positive response in the already advantaged group is a marked
possibility, which would then tend to reduce mobility and a stronger relation between parental
income and participation in education.
One factor can, however, be expected to almost certainly increase measured mobility, viz. a
reduction in the role of word-of-mouth communication. If a reduction in υ not only increases
participation in education in the community 2 (as shown in Proposition 8) but also (weakly) de-
creases it in the community 1, the eﬀect on measured intergenerational mobility will be strictly
positive.23 This illustrates that an understanding of cross-country diﬀerences in intergenera-
tional mobility may require going beyond a comparison of educational systems to consider also
the role of social networks and labour market institutions.
Finally a word on eﬃciency. Local spillovers imply that there are generally too few skilled
workers; this suggests that education should be encouraged e.g. through a general policy with
subsidies. However, the above analysis indicates that a general policy need not be unambigu-
ously eﬃciency enhancing. To see this, suppose that it leads to an asymmetric response with
a substantial increase in γ1 but a modest response in γ2. Due to the global spillover eﬀect,
skilled workers in community 1 find good jobs at rate that exceeds the rate at which such jobs
are created. Thus, for this reason, their private benefit to education tends to exceed the social
benefit. This of course simply reflects the global externality.24
VI Discussion
Empirical evidence suggests that intergenerational social mobility varies greatly across countries.
Low social mobility reflects, among other things, the positive relationship between parental
income and children’s education. The most common explanation among economists is that
family income matters for education because of credit constraints. A growing empirical literature
23To see this, recall that Φj (y) is given by (13). By applying the technique used in the proof of Lemma 4
one can show that ∂F1/∂υ > 0 and ∂F2/∂υ < 0. Then, using that dγ2/dυ < 0 and dγ1/dυ > 0, it follows that
∂Φ1/∂υ < 0 and ∂Φ2/∂υ > 0, whereby from (20), ∂µ/∂υ < 0.
24The eﬀect of a generic parameter α on total surplus in a steady state equilibrium can be shown to be
1
2
X
j=1,2
"¡
tj − t0
¢
∆w − π0
¡
γj
¢ Z θ(γj)
θ
θg (θ) dθ
#
∂γj
∂α
Note that t1 < t0 and t2 > t0 in a stratified equilibrium with γ1 > γ2.
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suggests, however, that the link between parental income and children’s education decisions may
emerge due to more long-run factors aﬀecting children’s development and opportunities. It is
for example frequently argued that rich and poor parents diﬀer in the attitudes and norms they
instill in their children; similarly, parental income may be correlated with the type of social
networks that the children inherit.
Determining the mechanisms underlying the positive education-parental income relationship
is of great importance in order to identify appropriate policies to promote human-capital invest-
ments and intergenerational social mobility. For example, policies designed to alleviate financial
constraints — such as education subsidies and income transfer policies — may have unintended
consequences if the link between parental income and education decision is, in fact, not due
to credit constraints. This point has recently been stressed by several authors; Cameron and
Heckman (1998), after finding empirically that long-run factors appear to be of primary impor-
tance, simulate the eﬀects of a general increase in family income on college attendance. Their
conclusion is that, while increasing resources available to parents is likely to increase enrollment,
the students that are attracted into college have considerably lower ability than those already
opting to attend. Similarly, Mulligan (1997), looking at intergenerational social mobility, finds
no support for the existence of significant credit constraints and concludes that government
policies designed to remove financial barriers to participation in education need not necessarily
lead to higher mobility.
A diﬀerent view on policy, based on the notion that more long-run factors are responsible
for the education-parental income relationship, is that governments should work to change the
structure of the economic environment in order to “level the playing field”, minimizing the
eﬀects of socioeconomic stratification and labour market segmentation.
The current paper has picked up on these ideas by formalizing one particular role played by
social environments, namely the role played by social networks in job-finding processes. While
the model is still a version of a parental investment model in the sense that rich parents can
“invest in good neighbors” in order to improve the lifetime opportunities of their children, credit
constraints do not play a role. The relation between parental income and education choices is
thus indirect, emerging through the link between parental income and the social environment
in which the children grow up.
The model provides one example of how, with this type of causal link, intuitions about the
eﬀects of policy or other shifts in the environment may be very diﬀerent from those obtained in
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models based on credit constraints. We found, for example, that a general reduction in the cost
of education or an increase in the returns to skill, could lead to highly asymmetric educational
responses across socioeconomic groups. The model also contains one parameter which captures
the notion of “leveling the playing field”; reducing the number of jobs that are allocated through
word-of-mouth communication promotes equal opportunities in labour markets, and was found
to generally promote both mobility and the eﬃcient use of talent.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Note first that ai (t) = −N˙i (t) /Ni (t). Hence from (6) and Assump-
tion 1 we then obtain −N˙ (t) /N (t) = K/ (T − t) for all t, where N (t) =
P
i=1,2Ni (t) is the
aggregate number of skilled workers, of age t, looking for good jobs. Solving the diﬀerential
equation yields
N (t) =
µ
T − t
T
¶K
N (0) (A1)
where N (0) is the total number of workers in the cohort acquiring skills. Since all vacancies
are filled immediately, M (t) = −N˙ (t), whereby the result follows immediately.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let γ1, γ2 > 0 and recall that half of each cohort are born into each
community. The number of agents in location j investing in education is then Nj (0) = γj/2
(in every cohort) while the aggregate number of workers investing in education is N (0) =
(γ1 + γ2) /2. Define ξ (t) as the fraction of the age-t skilled job-seekers who are from community
1:
ξ (t) =
N1 (t)
N (t)
, and 1− ξ (t) = N2 (t)
N (t)
. (A2)
We want to show that ξ (t) is uniquely identified. Using (10), along with (A1), yields:
ξ˙ (t)
ξ (t)
+ ϕ
ξ˙ (t)
1− ξ (t) = (1− ϕ)
K
T − t .
Removing the time-derivatives (using that ξ˙/ξ = d ln ξ/dt and ξ˙/ (1− ξ) = −d ln (1− ξ) /dt)
and integrating yields
ξ (t)
[1− ξ (t)]ϕ =
µ
T
T − t
¶K(1−ϕ)
C (γ1, γ2) (A3)
where C (·, ·) is a strictly positive continuous function. Inspection of equation (A3) reveals that
it has a unique solution ξ (t) ∈ (0, 1) for every t < T which varies continuously with γ1 and γ2.
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Note then that Fj (t) = 1−Nj (t) /Nj (0). Substituting for Nj (t) and Nj (0) then gives that
F1 (t) = 1− ξ (t)
(γ1 + γ2)
γ1
µ
T − t
T
¶K
,
while a similar expression holds for j = 2. To see the second part, recall that aj (·) is the
hazard rate associated with Fj (·); hence, ln (1− Fj (t)) = −
R t
0 aj (s) ds. The result then follows
from (10). Finally, if γj = 0, then by Assumption 1, ak (·) = a (·), which immediately implies
Fk (·) = F (·).
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that γ1 (·) and γ2 (·) are the same function. Hence any fixed-
point, γ∗, for γj (·) is a symmetric equilibrium. But γj (·) maps the unit interval into itself
and is continuous. Hence such a fixed-point exists. Moreover, as shown after Lemma (5), it
follows that γ0j (·) < 0 at any symmetric point, which implies uniqueness. The waiting time
t0 follows since γ1 = γ2 implies that F1 (·) = F2 (·) = F (·), defined in (7), which has the
expected waiting time T/ (1 +K). Independence of υ can be seen by noting that γ∗ satisfies
G−1 (γ∗)π (γ∗) = ∆w
¡
T − t0
¢
which does not depend on υ.
Proof of Lemma 4. Note that as an adding-up identity,
X
j=1,2
γj
2
Fj (t) = F (t)
X
j=1,2
γj
2
, for all t ∈ [0, T ] , (A4)
since both sides measure the number of skilled workers who have found good jobs by age t
(recall that γj/2 is the number of workers from community j who invest in education). Using
that [1− F1 (t)] = [1− F2 (t)]ϕ (Lemma 2) to substitute for F1 in (A4), and the diﬀerentiating
w.r.t. γ1 (noting that ϕ = (1− υ) + υ
γ1
γ2
), yields
∂F2 (t)
∂γ1
=
F (t)− F1 (t) + (1− F2 (t))ϕ υ γ1γ2 ln (1− F2 (t))
ϕγ1 (1− F2 (t))ϕ−1 + γ2
.
If γ1 ≥ γ2, then F1 (t) ≥ F (t) whereby the above derivative is strictly negative. On the other
hand, when γ1 < γ2 the sign is ambiguous. Similarly, diﬀerentiating w.r.t. γ2 to obtain the
own-eﬀect yields
∂F2 (t)
∂γ2
=
F (t)− F2 (t)− (1− F2 (t))ϕ υ
³
γ1
γ2
´2
ln (1− F2 (t))
γ1 (1− F2 (t))ϕ−1 ϕ+ γ2
.
If γ1 ≥ γ2, then F (t) ≥ F2 (t), whereby the derivative is strictly positive. On the other hand,
when γ1 < γ2 the own eﬀect is ambiguous.
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Proof of Lemma 5. By inspection of Figure 1 it is clear that local stability (of any equilib-
rium) corresponds to the condition ∂γj/∂γk >
¡
∂γk/∂γj
¢−1. Totally diﬀerentiating (14), which
defines γj (γk), gives
∂γj
∂γk
"
π
¡
γj
¢
g (θj)
+∆w
∂tj
∂γj
+ π0
¡
γj
¢
θj
#
= −∆w ∂tj
∂γk
. (A5)
The parenthesis is positive by (15), and, by Lemma 4, ∂tj/∂γk > 0 at a symmetric equilibrium.
At a symmetric equilibrium, ∂γj/∂γk = ∂γk/∂γj < 0, and the stability it can be stated as
∂γj/∂γk > −1, or
¯¯
∂γj/∂γk
¯¯
< 1.
Proof of Proposition 6. Using that the aggregate output of a cohort can be written in the
linear form given in the text, an eﬃcient pair (γ1, γ2) can be characterized as a solution to
max
γ1,γ2


TwL +
X
j=1,2
γj
2
£¡
T − t0
¢
∆w
¤
−
X
j=1,2
C
¡
γj
¢
2



where C (·) is defined in (17). Since the objective function can be written in this separable form,
is possible to optimize w.r.t. γ1 and γ2 separately, leading to the same set of maximizers.
Proof of Proposition 7. The analysis is facilitated by having explicit expressions for the
derivatives studied in Lemma 4. It turns out that the cross- and the own eﬀects diﬀer only by
sign: at a symmetric equilibrium
∂tj
∂γk
= − ∂tj
∂γj
=
υT
2γ∗
.
(A proof is available on request.) Using this, along with Assumption 3, to simplify
¯¯
∂γj/∂γk
¯¯
given in (16) yields the following expression for the slope, which we henceforth denote Σ,
Σ ≡
¯¯¯¯
∂γj
∂γk
¯¯¯¯
=
υ (1 +K) /K
2 (1− gθ∗a)− υ (1 +K) /K . (A6)
where θ∗ is the cut-oﬀ education cost (in both communities), which is positively related to γ∗
through the identity γ∗ = G (θ∗). From this we see that a generic parameter α has two eﬀects on
Σ. One is through θ∗; this is the “scale eﬀect”. The second is the direct eﬀect ∂Σ/∂α (holding
θ∗ constant); this is the “sensitivity eﬀect”.
Note that an increase in scale is destabilizing, ∂Σ/∂θ∗ > 0. Consider therefore the impact on
scale of the symmetric equilibrium. Using that t0 = T/ (1 +K) and that π (γ) = e−aγ , θ∗ can be
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characterized as follows as θ∗e−agθ∗ = ∆wTK/ (1 +K). Taking logs and totally diﬀerentiating
immediately yields that
∂θ∗
∂g
= δ0aθ > 0,
∂θ∗
∂∆w
=
δ0
∆w
> 0,
∂θ∗
∂K
=
δ0
K (1 +K)
> 0,
∂θ∗
∂a
= δ0gθ > 0,
where δ0 ≡ θ∗/ (1− agθ∗) is strictly positive by (15). This proves part 1. Turning to the
sensitivity eﬀects, ∂Σ/∂α, inspection of (A6) immediately reveals that Σ increases in g, a and
υ, but decreases in K. This proves part 2.
Proof of Proposition 8. Treating (14) for j, k = 1, 2 now as an equation system, and using
that (A5) provides an expression for γ0j (γk), (19) is obtained by straightforward comparative
statics. In order to derive the direct eﬀects, ∂γj/∂α, it is useful to rewrite (14) using Assumption
3 as γje−aγj = g∆w
¡
T − tj
¡
γj , γk
¢¢
. Note that K and υ enter only through the waiting time
tj . (The other parameters on the other hand do not directly aﬀect the waiting times.) Taking
logs and totally diﬀerentiating this equation then yields that
∂γj
∂g
=
δ1
g
> 0,
∂γj
∂∆w
=
δ1
∆w
> 0,
∂γj
∂K
= − δ1¡
T − tj
¢ ∂tj
∂K
,
∂γj
∂a
= δ1γj > 0, and
∂γj
∂υ
= − δ1¡
T − tj
¢ ∂tj
∂υ
,
where
δ1 ≡
1
γj
− a+ 1¡
T − tj
¢ ∂tj
∂γj
is strictly positive by (15). To determine the signs of ∂γj/∂K and ∂γj/∂υ we need to determine
the impacts on the waiting times. Applying the same technique as in the proof of Lemma 4,
using (7) and (10), reveals that ∂tj/∂K < 0 for j = 1, 2, while ∂tj/∂υ is strictly negative for
j = 1 and strictly positive for j = 2 when γ1 > γ2.
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